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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a source of 
systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to reduce systemic risk to the financial system 
by regulating this market. One of the reforms that Congress introduced in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 
111-203) was mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives through clearinghouses, in an effort to remake the 
OTC market more in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Clearinghouses require traders to put 
down cash or liquid assets, called margin, to cover potential losses and prevent any firm from building up 
a large uncapitalized exposure, as happened in the case of the American International Group (AIG). 
Clearinghouses thus limit the size of a cleared position based on a firm’s ability to post margin to cover its 
potential losses. 
As lawmakers focused on clearing requirements to reduce systemic risk, concerns also arose as to 
whether the small number of large swaps dealers in existence—mostly the largest banks—might influence 
clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could undermine the efficacy of the approach. Concerns 
about conflicts of interest in clearing center around whether, if large swap dealers dominate a 
clearinghouse, they might directly or indirectly restrict access to the clearinghouse; whether they might 
limit the scope of derivatives products eligible for clearing; or whether they might influence a 
clearinghouse to lower margin requirements. 
Trading in OTC derivatives is in fact concentrated around a dozen or so major dealers. The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimated that, as of the third quarter of 2010, five large commercial 
banks in the United States represented 96% of the banking industry’s total notional amounts of all 
derivatives; and those five banks represented 81% of the industry’s net credit exposure to derivatives. The 
first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives 
dealers. As a result of the high degree of market concentration, the failure of a large swaps dealer still has 
the potential to result in the nullification of tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts, which could pose 
a systemic threat. 
A 2009-proposed amendment proposed to H.R. 4173, which passed the House, would have limited 
ownership interest and governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large financial 
institutions and major swap participants. Sections 726 and 765 in the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act 
mandate that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), respectively, must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts of interest. However, it allowed the 
agencies to decide whether those rules include strict numerical limits on ownership or control. In the 
CFTC’s proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest, published on October 18, 2010, and on January 6, 
2011, the CFTC did choose to adopt strict ownership limits, along the lines of the Lynch amendment. The 
SEC’s proposed rule, published on October 13, 2010, does the same. 
This report examines how conflicts of interest may arise and analyzes the measures that the CFTC and 
SEC proposed to address them. It discusses what effect, if any, ownership and control limits may have on 
derivatives clearing; and whether such limits effectively address the types of conflicts of interest that are 
of concern to some in the 112th Congress. These rulemakings may interest the 112th Congress as part of 
its oversight authority for the CFTC and SEC. Trends in clearing and trading derivatives, and the ownership 
of swap clearinghouses, are discussed in the Appendix. 
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Summary 
The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a source of 
systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to reduce systemic risk to the financial 
system by regulating this market. One of the reforms that Congress introduced in the Dodd-Frank 
Act (P.L. 111-203) was mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives through clearinghouses, in an 
effort to remake the OTC market more in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. 
Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash or liquid assets, called margin, to cover potential 
losses and prevent any firm from building up a large uncapitalized exposure, as happened in the 
case of the American International Group (AIG). Clearinghouses thus limit the size of a cleared 
position based on a firm’s ability to post margin to cover its potential losses. 
As lawmakers focused on clearing requirements to reduce systemic risk, concerns also arose as to 
whether the small number of large swaps dealers in existence—mostly the largest banks—might 
influence clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could undermine the efficacy of the 
approach. Concerns about conflicts of interest in clearing center around whether, if large swap 
dealers dominate a clearinghouse, they might directly or indirectly restrict access to the 
clearinghouse; whether they might limit the scope of derivatives products eligible for clearing; or 
whether they might influence a clearinghouse to lower margin requirements. 
Trading in OTC derivatives is in fact concentrated around a dozen or so major dealers. The Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimated that, as of the third quarter of 2010, five 
large commercial banks in the United States represented 96% of the banking industry’s total 
notional amounts of all derivatives; and those five banks represented 81% of the industry’s net 
credit exposure to derivatives. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers. As a result of the high degree of 
market concentration, the failure of a large swaps dealer still has the potential to result in the 
nullification of tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts, which could pose a systemic threat. 
A 2009-proposed amendment proposed to H.R. 4173, which passed the House, would have 
limited ownership interest and governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large 
financial institutions and major swap participants. Sections 726 and 765 in the final version of the 
Dodd-Frank Act mandate that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), respectively, must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts 
of interest. However, it allowed the agencies to decide whether those rules include strict 
numerical limits on ownership or control. In the CFTC’s proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of 
interest, published on October 18, 2010, and on January 6, 2011, the CFTC did choose to adopt 
strict ownership limits, along the lines of the Lynch amendment. The SEC’s proposed rule, 
published on October 13, 2010, does the same. 
This report examines how conflicts of interest may arise and analyzes the measures that the 
CFTC and SEC proposed to address them. It discusses what effect, if any, ownership and control 
limits may have on derivatives clearing; and whether such limits effectively address the types of 
conflicts of interest that are of concern to some in the 112th Congress. These rulemakings may 
interest the 112th Congress as part of its oversight authority for the CFTC and SEC. Trends in 
clearing and trading derivatives, and the ownership of swap clearinghouses, are discussed in the 
Appendix.  
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Background 
The financial crisis implicated the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a 
major source of systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to introduce regulatory 
controls over this market, which many viewed as opaque and unregulated. A central element of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) is a requirement 
that certain swaps be cleared by regulated derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs).1 
Clearing is an institutional arrangement that helps protect against counterparty default. A DCO, or 
clearinghouse, clears and settles derivatives contracts between counterparties. This report 
examines how conflicts of interest in derivatives clearinghouses may arise, and what impact such 
conflicts could have on derivatives reform. It analyzes the measures that the CFTC and SEC have 
proposed to address such conflicts, and whether such proposed measures effectively address the 
types of conflicts of interest that are of concern to some in the 112th Congress. These rulemakings 
may interest the 112th Congress as part of its oversight authority over the CFTC and SEC. 
Clearinghouses are a long-standing feature of futures exchanges. They exist to deal with a credit 
risk problem inherent in derivatives trading. Because derivatives are contracts linked to volatile 
prices, rates, or other variables, large losses may occur from time to time. Derivatives are bilateral 
contracts—typically, one counterparty benefits if the underlying price or rate rises; the other if it 
falls. How do the winners know that the losers will meet their contractual obligations? The 
clearinghouse guarantees payment of all contracts, offering an efficient alternative to requiring 
each trader to monitor the financial resources of other traders. 
To ensure that it can make good on its guarantees, a clearinghouse requires all derivatives traders 
to put down cash to cover potential losses (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract, 
and requires subsequent cash deposits (called maintenance or interim margin) on a daily basis to 
help cover any actual losses to the position. If traders fail to answer a call for additional 
maintenance margin, their positions may be liquidated. The effect of the margin system is to 
eliminate the possibility that any market participant can build up an uncapitalized exposure (or 
paper loss) so large that default would cause the clearinghouse to fail. Initial margin rates are 
calculated to approximate the largest daily loss that a contract might experience under extreme 
market conditions. Margin rates are adjusted frequently to reflect shifts in volatility. 
In addition to the margin system, members of the clearinghouse contribute capital to a fund to 
cover defaults, in the event that (1) the customer, (2) the broker, and (3) the clearing broker2 are 
unable to meet the terms of a contract. No futures clearinghouse in the United States has ever 
failed. 
Although the clearinghouse system was developed by private markets to deal with credit risk, 
posting margin to cover potential and actual losses has important consequences for systemic risk3 
                                               
1
 For an overview of Dodd-Frank’s derivatives provisions, see CRS Report R41398, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives, by Mark Jickling and Kathleen Ann Ruane. 
2
 A clearinghouse generally accepts only contracts brought to it by a member firm. Non-member brokers must establish 
a correspondent relationship with a member in order to clear their customers’ transactions. 
3
 Systemic risk is risk that can potentially cause instability for large parts of the financial system. For more on systemic 
risk, see CRS Report R41384, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Systemic Risk and 
(continued...) 
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as well. If a large derivatives trader fails, and the losses are not margined, its counterparties will 
be exposed to losses. There may be a widening circle of defaults, in the manner of dominos 
falling. This was a consideration that led the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to inject hundreds 
of billions of dollars into the American International Group (AIG) in 20084—the fear that AIG’s 
large bank counterparties would fail (or be perceived by the market as likely to fail, which can 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy if other institutions withhold credit). 
Clearinghouses limit the size of a cleared position based on a firm’s ability to post margin to 
cover its potential losses. If AIG had been required to clear its contracts and post margin, it would 
likely have run out of money long before its derivatives position reached a size that could threaten 
systemic stability. An important aim of the derivatives reforms in Dodd-Frank is to ensure that the 
scale of exposure that resulted in the downfall of AIG is not repeated. 
Pre-Dodd-Frank Act Market Structure and Regulation 
The different types of derivative financial instruments are used for the same broad purposes—
hedging business risk and taking on risk in search of speculative profits.5 Prior to the Dodd-Frank 
Act, however, these instruments were traded in different types of markets. Futures contracts are 
traded on exchanges regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Stock 
options are traded on exchanges regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
But swaps (and security-based swaps, as well as some options) were traded OTC, rather than on 
organized exchanges, and were not regulated by anyone. 
The mechanism that exchanges use to deal with the issues of credit risk is a clearinghouse.6 The 
process is shown in Figure 1 below: (1) two traders taking opposite sides of a contract (called 
long and short) agree on a transaction on the exchange floor or over an electronic platform. (2) 
Once the trade is made, it goes to the clearinghouse, which guarantees payment to both parties. 
(3) In effect, the original contract between a long and a short trader is now two contracts, one 
between each trader and the clearinghouse. The traders do not have to monitor the risk of 
counterparty default because the clearinghouse stands behind all trades. 
In the OTC market, shown on the right side of Figure 1, the long and short traders do not interact 
directly. Instead of a centralized marketplace, there is a network of dealers who stand ready to 
take either long or short positions, and make money on spreads and fees. The dealer absorbs the 
credit risk of customer default, while the customer faces the risk of dealer default. In this kind of 
market, the dealers are expected to be solid and creditworthy financial institutions. The OTC 
market that emerged was dominated by two or three dozen very large and diversified institutions 
like JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and their foreign counterparts. Before 2007, 
such firms were generally viewed as too well diversified or too well managed to fail. In 2008, 
their vulnerability was shown to be greater than previously assumed, and the question of their 
long-term creditworthiness now depends in part on whether the government would again 
                                                             
(...continued) 
the Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 
4
 See CRS Report R40438, Federal Government Assistance for American International Group (AIG), by Baird Webel. 
5
 For the mechanics of derivatives, see CRS Report R40646, Derivatives Regulation in the 111th Congress, by Mark 
Jickling and Rena S. Miller. 
6
 Also referred to as a central counterparty or as a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). 
Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
intervene to ensure that their contracts are honored during a future crisis. (Title II of Dodd-Frank 
seeks to ensure that such risk is not borne by the taxpayer.)7 
In the OTC market, some contracts required collateral or margin, but not all. There was no 
uniform practice: all contract terms were negotiable. A trade group, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), published best practice standards for use of collateral, but 
compliance was voluntary. The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to make standardized clearing of all forms 
of derivatives the norm, especially in transactions where the counterparties are systemically 
important financial institutions. 
Figure 1. Derivatives Market Structure: Exchanges and Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
 
Source: CRS. 
The Dodd-Frank Clearing Reforms 
Sections 723 and 763 of Dodd-Frank8 require that all forms of OTC derivatives that meet the 
broad statutory definition of “swap” be submitted to a registered DCO for clearing, unless (1) no 
clearinghouse will accept the contract for clearing, or (2) one of the counterparties to the swap is 
an exempt commercial end-user. 
                                               
7
 See CRS Report R41384, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Systemic Risk and the 
Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 
8
 Section 723 deals with swaps under CFTC regulation, while section 763 sets out parallel requirements for security-
based swaps, regulated by the SEC. 
Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
Even with the exemptions, the law will result in trillions of dollars in derivatives transactions 
moving from the OTC dealer market into a clearing environment. At present some swaps are 
cleared voluntarily, but the volume of clearing is likely to expand manyfold when Dodd-Frank 
becomes effective.9 
Although the clearing model has historically proved robust in the futures industry, there are 
concerns about a sudden upsurge in the volume of swaps clearing. Unlike futures, many swaps 
are customized and complex contracts. The value of most futures contracts is linked directly to 
the price of a single underlying commodity, rate, or index, or a ratio. To calculate the potential 
risk from a futures position, one simply needs to estimate the volatility of the underlying interest. 
With swaps, the relationship between changes in the underlying variables and the value of the 
contract may not be linear. Also unlike futures, swaps do not have standardized maturity dates. 
Some swap markets may have low trading volume, but very large contract sizes. Because of these 
distinctions, pricing risk in swaps may be more complex and prone to error than pricing risk in 
futures. 
Difficulty in pricing swaps could be a source of systemic risk. If derivatives risk is concentrated 
in a handful of clearinghouses, failure to price risk correctly (and set margins accordingly) could 
cause a clearinghouse to fail during a market crisis, potentially with systemic repercussions. 
Rather than simply mandate clearing, Dodd-Frank includes a number of safeguards intended to 
mitigate the risks in swaps clearing. 
Safeguards for Swaps Clearing 
Congress addressed two major concerns about swaps clearing in the Dodd-Frank Act: risk 
management and control and governance of clearinghouses. Before a swap can be cleared, several 
hurdles must be crossed: 
• A clearinghouse must be willing to accept the swap for clearing. Under Dodd-
Frank, regulators may not force DCOs to clear swaps.10 Thus, if clearinghouses 
deem a particular product too risky for clearing, they do not have to accept it. 
• The regulators must approve the swap for clearing. If the CFTC or SEC 
believes that a DCO lacks the technical expertise or financial resources to 
manage the risk in clearing a swap or class of swaps, the swap may not be 
cleared. 
• DCOs must meet regulatory and statutory standards. Sections 725 and 762 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act set out sets of core principles that DCOs must meet as a 
condition of registration. These include having adequate financial, managerial, 
and operational resources; appropriate standards for accepting swaps for clearing; 
the ability to manage risk; and risk control mechanisms that limit exposure to 
losses that could disrupt clearing operations or spill over onto non-defaulting 
market participants. 
                                               
9
 The SEC and CFTC clearing rules are due to be in place by July 21, 2011, one year from enactment. 
10
 Regulators may, however, designate classes of swaps that should be cleared, even if no DCO is clearing them. If such 
swaps are still not cleared, the regulators may impose conditions on transactions in them. Regulators may also write 
rules to prevent evasion of the clearing mandate. 
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From one perspective, enforcing the above provisions of the law may not require a heavy 
regulatory hand. DCOs have strong economic incentives to make sure that (1) market participants 
post enough margin to cover their individual losses; (2) the exchange membership as a whole has 
sufficient capital to mutualize losses should a member institution or customer fail; (3) that the 
DCO can net out its position through offsetting counterparty positions, so that it is not at risk 
from market price fluctuations; and (4) that trades are transparent enough to enable effective 
monitoring of emerging risks to the trading network. The incentives of clearinghouses to stay in 
business and the incentives of regulators to prevent financial instability appear to be aligned. 
However, Congress and regulators have identified potential counter-incentives that may lead 
DCOs to act in a way that increases systemic risk. In theory, there may be short-term commercial 
advantages to behavior that works against stability. In particular, attention focused on the 
possibility that the handful of dealer banks that dominated the OTC derivatives market could 
weaken the Dodd-Frank reforms by exercising undue influence over the clearing process. 
Conflicts of Interest in Clearing 
As lawmakers focused on clearing, concerns arose as to whether the small number of large swaps 
dealers in existence might influence clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could 
undermine the potential efficacy of clearing in mitigating systemic risk. Could powerful large 
banks that were both swap dealers and clearing members in a derivatives clearinghouse influence 
the clearinghouse not to clear certain OTC products in order to maintain the status quo in the 
lucrative swaps dealing business? Could they influence a clearinghouse to set margin 
insufficiently low for certain OTC swaps for which they dominated the market? Could they set 
capital requirements for clearing members unnecessarily high to keep smaller banks out of the 
OTC market, limit competition, and maintain higher fees? 
The Dodd-Frank Act directs the CFTC and SEC to identify the nature and sources of any conflicts 
of interest that relate to the voting interests in, or governance of, a DCO that may interfere with 
achieving the policy objectives of the clearing mandate. The SEC has identified three types of 
conflicts of interest:11 
• First, DCO members could limit access to the clearing agency. This can occur 
either by restricting direct participation in the clearing agency, or restricting 
indirect access by controlling the ability of non-members to enter into 
correspondent clearing arrangements. 
• Second, DCO members could limit the scope of products eligible for clearing, 
particularly if there is a strong economic incentive to keep a product traded in the 
OTC market, where there is less transparency and dealer spreads between bid and 
ask prices are likely to be wider.  
• Third, DCO members could use their influence to lower the risk management 
controls of a clearinghouse to reduce the amount of collateral they would be 
                                               
11
 SEC, “Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-
Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges With Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC; Proposed Rule,” Federal Register, vol. 75, October 26, 2010, p. 65885. 
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required to contribute and liquidity resources they would have to expend as 
margin or guaranty fund to the security-based swap clearing agency. 
The CFTC identifies similar potential conflicts of interest. First, in determining whether a swap 
contract is capable of being cleared; second, in determining the minimum criteria that an entity 
must meet to become a clearinghouse member; and third, in determining whether a particular 
entity satisfies the membership criteria.12 Others have raised a related issue: the possibility of a 
“race to the bottom” if competing clearinghouses cut margin requirements to imprudent levels in 
search of market share. While this strategy might jeopardize the long-term survival of the DCO, it 
could generate short-term profits from clearing fees. 
These concerns largely reflect the possibility that large derivatives dealers could come to 
dominate swaps clearing and essentially seek to preserve the status quo ante of the OTC market. 
Parts of the concern may appear counterintuitive—why would a clearinghouse refuse to clear?—
or may be addressed elsewhere—regulators have authority to require that access to DCOs be open 
and nondiscriminatory. Some may find improbable the scenario of clearinghouse members 
deliberately setting capital and margin standards too low. Nonetheless, the issue of concentrated 
ownership and control of derivatives clearinghouses was a subject of intense debate in the 111th 
Congress and was addressed in different ways by various iterations of the financial reform 
legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Legislative Approaches to Conflicts of Interest 
As concerns about the structure of clearinghouses arose in 2009, Representative Stephen F. Lynch 
proposed an amendment to H.R. 4173, which would have restricted ownership interest and 
governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large financial institutions and major 
swap participants.13 The Lynch amendment set a 20% limit on the collective ownership of 
clearing and trading entities by so-called “restricted owners,” which included swap dealers, major 
swap participants, and their security-based swap counterparts, to prevent conflicts of interest. The 
Lynch amendment was adopted by the House by a vote of 228-202. 
The Senate, however, did not take the approach of the Lynch amendment in its version of H.R. 
4173. The provisions of the Lynch amendment were ultimately not included in the conference 
report on H.R. 4173, but the report did, in Sections 726 and 765, include language related to 
conflicts of interest in swaps clearinghouses. The final version of Dodd-Frank does not impose 
statutory restrictions on DCO ownership, but does require the regulators to make rules to mitigate 
conflicts of interest, which could include numerical limits on control and ownership of 
clearinghouses. 
An examination of the legislative history documents accompanying H.R. 4173 does not reveal a 
rationale for the conferees omitting the language of the Lynch amendment in their final report, or 
in choosing to include the conflict of interest provisions of Sections 726 and 765. During 
conference deliberations on H.R. 4173, the House conferees reportedly proposed legislative 
                                               
12
 CFTC, “Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution 
Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest,” Federal Register, vol. 75, October 18, 2010, p. 63732. 
13
 For text of amendment, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Rules, Report to Accompany H.Res. 964, H. Rept, 
111-370, 111th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 2009), pp. 188-192. 
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language to their Senate counterparts which included the language of the Lynch amendment.14 In 
doing so, Conference Chairman Representative Barney Frank stated that he and the House 
conferees viewed the Lynch language as “very important.”15 
Senate conferees reportedly rejected portions of the House offer, including the Lynch language.16 
Instead of setting strict ownership caps, they opted to require regulators to write rules to mitigate 
conflicts of interest, which could include numerical limits on the control and ownership of 
clearinghouses, exchanges and other entities.17 The House ultimately accepted the Senate 
position. In a June 30, 2010, colloquy on the House floor, Representatives Lynch and Frank 
clarified the intent of Sections 726 and 765 of the conference report, including making clear that 
the rulemaking envisioned by the sections was mandatory, not to be done at the discretion of the 
CFTC and the SEC.18 
In the final Dodd-Frank Act, Sections 726 and 765 mandate that the CFTC and SEC, respectively, 
must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts of interest; but leave it to the agencies themselves to decide 
whether those rules should include strict numerical limits on ownership or control. 
Regulatory Proposals 
Both the CFTC and the SEC published proposed rules on conflicts of interest in October 2010. 
The rules included similar percentage limits on ownership and voting control of DCOs. In 
addition, the releases contain a number of proposed requirements that DCOs have governance 
structures to insulate them from control by large financial institutions. 
In the CFTC’s proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest, published on October 18, 2010,19 
and on January 6, 2011,20 the CFTC did choose to propose strict ownership limits, along the lines 
of the Lynch amendment. The SEC’s proposed rules also adopt such limits.21 The CFTC and SEC 
propose to limit the amount of voting equity or voting power that certain “enumerated entities”22 
may own or exercise, individually or collectively, with respect to DCOs.23 The enumerated 
entities are those set forth in the statute:24 (1) bank holding companies with total consolidated 
                                               
14
 “House-Senate Conference Committee Holds A Meeting on Walls Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.” 
Financial Markets Regulatory Wire, June 24, 2010, CQ Transcriptions, LLC. 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 156, June 30, 2010, p. H5217. 
19
 CFTC, “Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution 
Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest,” Federal Register, vol. 75, October 18, 2010, p. 63732. 
20
 CFTC, “Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities; Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest,” Federal Register, vol. 
76, January 6, 2011, p. 722. 
21
 SEC, “17 CFR Part 242: Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing 
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges With Respect to Security-
Based Swaps Under Regulation MC,” Federal Register, vol. 75, October. 26, 2010, p. 65882. 
22
 The SEC rule does the same thing, but refers to these as “specified entities.” 
23
 The ownership limits will also apply to designated contract markets (futures exchanges) and swap execution facilities 
(created by Dodd-Frank). 
24
 Section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act; 15 U.S.C. § 8323(a). 
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assets over $50 billion and their affiliates, (2) nonbank financial companies supervised by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and affiliates of such companies, (3) swap 
dealers and associated persons of swap dealers, and (4) major swap participants (MSPs) and 
associated persons of MSPs. 
Under the proposed rules, a DCO may choose to comply with either of two alternative sets of 
ownership and control limits: 
Option One. A DCO member may not individually: 
• beneficially own more than 20% of any class of voting equity in the DCO; or 
• directly or indirectly vote an interest exceeding 20% of the voting power of any 
class of equity interest in the DCO. 
In addition, enumerated entities—regardless of DCO membership—may not collectively: 
• beneficially own more than 40% of any class of voting equity in a DCO; or 
• directly or indirectly vote an interest exceeding 40% of the voting power of any 
class of equity interest in the DCO. 
Option Two. A DCO member or enumerated entity regardless of DCO membership may not: 
• own more than 5% of any class of voting equity in the DCO; or directly or 
indirectly vote an interest exceeding 5% of the voting power of any class of 
equity interest in the DCO. 
Some opponents of the proposed rules argue that mandating a more fragmented ownership 
structure for DCOs could lead them to be under-capitalized.25 This is risky for DCOs, they argue, 
which would benefit in times of crisis from the large amounts of capital required to be held by the 
current large swap dealers who already dominate the swaps market—most of them big banks. If 
regulators restrict the ownership of DCOs by such large banks, they argue, then smaller and less 
well-capitalized entities will have to make up the rest of the clearing members, thereby reducing 
both critical swap-market expertise and access to capital on the part of the DCO. They also argue 
that limiting the ownership of large banks who are the major swap dealers would also limit the 
crucial expertise on swaps that DCOs need in order to accurately assess the riskiness of various 
derivatives, and to decide whether to clear them, and if so, how to set margin requirements 
accurately. 
One of the five CFTC commissioners, Jill E. Sommers, voted against the rule proposal, arguing 
that the voting equity restrictions are not necessary or appropriate to mitigate the perceived 
conflicts and may stifle competition by preventing the formation of new swaps trading and 
                                               
25
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26325, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Ernest C. Goodrich Jr. for Deutsche 
Bank AG, October 26, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26325&
SearchText=. See also Comment No. 26411, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Robert Pickel for the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., November 16, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/
PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26411&SearchText=. Also see Comment for File No. S7-27-10, from John 
S. Willian for Goldman, Sachs & Co., November 18, 2010, at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710.shtml. 
See also Comment No. 26410, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Janet McGinness for NYSE Liffe US 
LLC, November 16, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26410&SearchText=. 
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clearing firms. Commissioner Sommers also noted that the European Commission rejected 
ownership limitations.26 
The CFTC previously addressed a similar kind of structural conflict of interest in a 2007 final rule 
addressing conflicts of interest in futures exchanges (designated contract markets, or DCMs).27 In 
the regulatory framework prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, DCMs were subject to flexible “core 
principles,” including core principle 15 regarding conflicts of interest, instead of more 
prescriptive rules. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act retains various DCM core principles with 
certain additions and changes (and renumbers 15 to 16). Core principle 16 requires DCMs to 
establish and enforce rules (1) to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision-making process of 
the DCM, and (2) to establish a process for resolving such conflicts of interest.28 The CFTC’s 
2007 final rule adopted “acceptable practices” for minimizing conflicts of interest pursuant to the 
DCM core principle. The acceptable practices address conflicts of interest within DCMs as they 
transform from member-owned, not-for-profit entities into diverse enterprises with a variety of 
business models and ownership structures.29 The CFTC indicated that the presence of potentially 
conflicting demands, that is, regulatory authority coupled with commercial incentives to misuse 
such authority, constitutes a new structural conflict of interest.30 The Dodd-Frank Act also 
contains a revised set of core principles for DCOs,31 including management of conflicts of 
interest. 
In addition to the numerical ownership restrictions, the CFTC and SEC propose to require certain 
governance structures to prevent conflicts of interest in DCOs. These include 
• a requirement that 35% of DCO boards of directors (or at least two board 
members) be independent directors;32 
• a requirement that 35% of any committee with authority to act on behalf of the 
board of directors regarding management of a DCO must consist of independent 
directors; and 
• a requirement that each DCO have a Risk Management Committee with a 
composition of 35% independent directors with sufficient expertise in, among 
other things, clearing services. 
                                               
26
 Ibid., p. 63753. The European Commission announced its proposal on September 15, 2010. See European 
Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories,” at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:52010PC0484:EN:NOT. 
27
 CFTC, “Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”),” Federal Register, 
vol. 72, February 14, 2007, p. 6936. (Hereinafter cited as 2007 DCM Conflicts Release.) 
28
 Section 735(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(16). 
29
 2007 DCM Conflicts Release, p. 6937. The acceptable practices, among other things, require 35% representation of 
public directors on a DCM board and set rules requiring oversight committees, but do not establish ownership limits. 
30
 Ibid, p. 6939. The CFTC also expresses concern that sustained competition between DCMs and SEFs for the same 
swaps contracts may exacerbate certain structural conflicts of interest.  
31
 Section 725(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2). 
32
 No director may qualify as an independent director unless the full board affirmatively determines that the director 
does not have a material relationship with (1) the DCO or an affiliate, or (2) a DCO member or affiliate. 
Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
Additionally, the CFTC rules include 
• the prohibition of a DCO from being operated by another entity unless such 
entity agrees to comport with such requirements in the same manner as the DCO; 
and  
• the prohibition of a DCO from permitting itself to be operated by any entity 
unless such entity agrees to subject (1) its officers, directors, employees, and 
agents to CFTC or SEC authority, and (2) makes its books and records available 
to the CFTC or SEC for inspection. 
Opponents of the Rule 
Some fear that the conflicts of interest rules will harm competition by limiting entry of new 
DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs to the market.33 They warn that the rule will hinder the ability of new 
DCOs to find investors who will devote their time, expertise, and capital if they know they are 
not able to retain more than a 20% voting equity.34 Without basic governance rights, these critics 
argue, investors would lose control over commercial interests (which would include revenue 
policy and intellectual property). At the same time, they argue, it will force existing DCOs to find 
ways to replace the portion of their capital that is currently funded by “enumerated entities.” They 
protest that, in effect, the rule will limit trading and clearing options for market participants, limit 
competition, and cause market uncertainty—as traders question the security of funds for existing 
DCOs.35 
Additionally, some of the industry’s largest banks argue that a limit on aggregate ownership of 
DCOs (the second option of the CFTC’s proposed rule) can cause conflicts of interest amongst 
non-members, also potentially exacerbating systemic risk.36 They fear that non-member owners 
will not possess the appropriate expertise to manage their entities’ decisions and they will not 
share the same principles that prioritize risk management over return on investments. In most 
clearinghouse structures, they explain, non-member owners may not share the same risk exposure 
                                               
33
 See, e.g., Comment No. 27266, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Kathleen M. Cronin for CME 
Group Inc. November, 17 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=27266&
SearchText=. See also e.g., Comment No. 26474, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from James B. Fuqua for 
UBS Securities LLC. November 17, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=
26474&SearchText=. See also e.g., Comment No. 26422, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Timothy G. 
McDermott for Nadex, November 17, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=
26422&SearchText= 
34
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26429, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Thomas Book for Eurex Clearing 
AG. November 17, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26429&SearchText=. 
See also Comment No. 26474, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from James B. Fuqua for UBS Securities 
LLC. November 17, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26474&SearchText=. 
35
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26700, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Edward J. Rosen for Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch; Barclays Capital; BNP Paribas; Citi; Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank; Credit 
Suisse Securities (USA); Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC; Morgan Stanley; Nomura Securities International, Inc.; PNC 
Bank, National Association; UBS Securities LLC; Wells Fargo & Company. Please see attachment. December 3, 2010, 
at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26700&SearchText=. 
36
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26700, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Edward J. Rosen for Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch; Barclays Capital; BNP Paribas; Citi; Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank; Credit 
Suisse Securities (USA); Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC; Morgan Stanley; Nomura Securities International, Inc.; PNC 
Bank, National Association; UBS Securities LLC; Wells Fargo & Company. Please see attachment. December 3, 2010, 
at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26700&SearchText=. 
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as members when a counterparty defaults, and this can compel them to take greater risks when 
making important business decisions. 
Meanwhile some commenters have noted that the rule will be ineffective for mitigating conflicts 
of interest amongst members and non-members. They claim that putting a cap on ownership 
rights does not restrict voting rights—and thus the influence—that a dealer might wield over a 
DCO.37 For this reason, they recommend that the regulatory agencies weigh the realistic costs of 
the ownership rule against its supposed benefits. 
Proponents of the Rule 
Proponents of the rule, on the other hand, underscore the risk that the system and the DCOs, 
SEFs, and DCMs would face if allowed to operate by only a handful of large firms.38 The main 
problem with allowing these entities to remain unrestricted in ownership and voting rights, they 
argue, is such entities will unlikely demand sufficient collateral to control risk. We saw the same 
large banks fail to require sufficient collateral from AIG in the lead-up to the financial crisis, they 
explain; and as a result of the “undercapitalization” of these banks, billions of dollars were 
needed from Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC to prevent widespread default. There is 
therefore no guarantee that the financial industry’s largest banks would require the appropriate 
level of collateral when running their clearinghouses, these commenters argue. Without the 
proposed SEC and CFTC rule, they believe the system would be vulnerable to the same risk that 
was present before the crisis, this time with concentrated risk among the nation’s largest 
clearinghouses. 
Then, there is also concern that the agencies have not gone far enough in limiting dealers from 
gaining monopolistic control over clearinghouses, SEFs, and exchanges.39 They argue that the 
purpose of Dodd-Frank—to limit the dominance of the five large banks in the OTC market, and 
to promote greater competition amongst market participants—is not being fulfilled by the 
issuance of a 5% ownership cap by any one entity or broker. The problem, they explain, is that 
brokers will still be able to “band together” to collectively own the majority of DCO, SEF, and 
DCM operations, which the large banks are likely to do since they share similar interests. After 
forming these inconspicuous cohorts, they argue, the big banks will be able to dictate the decision 
making in their respective exchanges, clearinghouses, and execution facilities. Because of this 
potential loophole (i.e., the fact that the rule does not mandate a limit on aggregate ownership), 
                                               
37
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26410, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Janet McGinness for NYSE Liffe 
US LLC. November 16, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26410&
SearchText=. 
38
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26486, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Sherrod Brown for United States 
Senate. November 18, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26486&
SearchText=. 
39
 See, e.g., Comment No. 26291, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Stephen F. Lynch for U.S. House of 
Representatives. October 18, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26291&
SearchText=. See also Comment No. 26341, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Michael E. Capuano for 
U.S. House of Representatives, October 29, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?
id=26341&SearchText=. See also Comment No. 26975, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 63732, from Michael N. 
Castle for U.S. House of Representatives, November 14, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/
ViewComment.aspx?id=26975&SearchText=. See also Comment No. 26432, Comment for Proposed Rule 75 FR 
63732, from Joshua Miller for Senate Corporations Committee, November 17, 2010, at http://comments.cftc.gov/
PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26432&SearchText=. 
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these critics encourage the CFTC and the SEC to consider issuing stronger restrictions on 
collective ownership that will better ensure that no one entity or class of entities will dominate 
DCOs. 
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Appendix. Current Ownership of Swap 
Clearinghouses 
Over the past decade, most exchanges and clearinghouses have become “vertically integrated,” 
meaning the DCOs have become subsidiaries or divisions within certain exchanges.40 Throughout 
the United States and Europe, there are three main clearinghouse-exchanges that clear and trade 
OTC derivatives: the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME), the IntercontinentalExchange 
(ICE), and LCH.Clearnet. The ownership structure and operations of these clearinghouses and 
exchanges will likely be affected by Dodd-Frank and the CFTC’s proposed rules. 
The CME group currently appears to have just a small share of its business in clearing OTC 
derivatives, relative to regulated futures.41 The CME ClearPort began clearing interest rate swaps 
on October 18, 2010.42 As of February 8, 2011, it had more than $900 million in outstanding 
notional interest rate swap contracts.43 This is a fraction of a percent of the global interest rate 
swaps market.44 CME ClearPort’s buy-side participants are BlackRock, Citadel, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and PIMCO. The sell-side participants are BofA Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, 
Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, and 
UBS. 
CME ClearPort was originally created in May of 2002 to clear OTC natural gas products for 
CME. CME has also provided clearing services for credit default swap (CDS) contracts since 
2009, but CME’s CDS clearing business remains relatively small compared with ICE’s.45 News 
media also reported that ICE tends to clear the majority of CDS products that are cleared, 
whereas CME only clears a small amount.46 By the end of 2009, ICE Trust had cleared more than 
$4 trillion worth of notional CDS contracts.47 This represented 16% of the global CDS market. As 
                                               
40
 LCH.Clearnet appears to be an exception to this trend. See Craig Pirrong, “The Industrial Organization of Execution, 
Clearing and Settlement in Financial Markets,” December 21, 2006. 
41
 The CME’s main clearing business right now is interest rate futures; see p. 21 of CME 10-Q form for the SEC for 
2010, at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1156375/000119312510250139/d10q.htm. It operates four 
exchanges: The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (CBOT), The New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and the Commodity Exchange (COMEX). It operates its clearing business 
through CME ClearPort. For its plans to capture more of the European OTC market, see “CME Group Reports Fourth 
Quarter Earnings and Plans for Returning More Capital to Shareholders,” by Michael Wong for Morning Star, February 
3, 2011, at http://torontostar.morningstar.ca/globalhome/industry/news.asp?articleid=368898. 
42
 See CME Group, “CME Group Begins Clearing OTC Interest Rate Swaps,” press release, October 18, 2010, 
http://cmegroup.mediaroom.com/index.php?item=3073&pagetemplate=article&s=43. 
43
 CME Group, “Interest Rate Swaps Market Data Reports,” press release, February 2, 2011, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc/irs.html. 
44
 The BIS estimates that in 2010 interest rate swaps totaled $347 trillion. See Bank of International Settlements, 
Amounts outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
45
  See Christine Birkner, “Credit default swaps clearing buy side access achieved,” Futuresmag.com, February 1, 2010, 
at http://www.futuresmag.com/Issues/2010/February-2010/Pages/Credit-default-swaps-buy-side-access-achieved.aspx. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 From January to September in 2010, Ice Trust, ICE’s U.S. clearinghouse, cleared $4.1 trillion of CDS notional value. 
See p. 27 of Securities Exchange Commission, “Intercontinental Exchange Form 10-Q,” press release, September 10, 
2010, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1174746/000119312510241968/d10q.htm. 
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of February 8, 2011, CME’s net notional outstanding U.S. contracts equaled $33 million,48 which 
represented a very small amount of the CDS market.49 
CME Group’s ownership structure is comparatively heterogeneous: 0.86% is owned by individual 
stakeholders; 29.67% is owned by mutual fund holders; and 37.78% is owned by other 
institutions.50 The largest percentages of shares are owned by BackRock Fund Advisors (at 
4.35%), Vanguard Group, Inc (at 3.61%), State Street Global Advisors (at 3.50%), Alliace 
Bernstein LP (at 3.30%), and Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP (at 2.81%). 
ICE, like CME, has vertically integrated execution, clearing, and settling facilities. ICE is owned 
0.28% by individuals, 31.41% by funds, and 70.10% by institutions.51 Its largest shareholders are 
T. Rowe Price (at 9.82%), Sands Capital Management (at 5.64%), Delaware Management 
Business Trust (at 4.84%), and Vanguard Group (at 4.46%).52 ICE has been clearing CDSs since 
2009, when 10 major banks put forth funds to establish its OTC clearinghouse.53 Along with 
LCH, it is the largest clearer of OTC derivatives, but mostly for the CDS market. 
For the OTC market as a whole, the interest rate swaps market is by far the largest OTC product 
traded, representing about 93% of the notional amount of OTC derivatives.54 LCH is the largest 
interest rate swap clearinghouse. LCH currently clears more than 40% of the interest rate swaps 
market. According to its 2009 annual report, LCH has more than $200 trillion outstanding in 
interest rate swap trades that it has cleared using its subsidiary, SwapClear.55 This represents 57% 
of the global interest rate swaps market.56 
Unlike CME, LCH’s ownership is more concentrated. It is a holding company that was created as 
part of a merger in December 2003 to oversee LCH.Clearnet Limited and LCH.Clearnet SA.57 
                                               
48
 See chart for CME Group, CDS Market Data Reports, at http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/cds/cds-data.html. 
49
 DTCC estimates the net notional amount of the CDS market to be $2.3 trillion as of December 31, 2010, while the 
gross notional reported was $25.5 trillion. See ISDA, CDS Marketplace, at http://www.isdacdsmarketplace.com/
market_statistics. 
50
 CNNMoney, “CME Group Inc,” press release, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/quote/shareholders/shareholders.html. 
51
 Morningstar, “CME Group Inc.,” press release, January 31, 2011, http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/
shareholders-overview.html?t=CME. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 In 2009, Bank of America, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS became the initial clearing members of ICE Trust. Each contributed 
“significantly” to the trust’s guarantee fund. See ICE, press release, 2009. http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID=369373. This was during ICE’s March 6, 2009, acquisition of The Clearing Corporation (TCC)—which 
cleared U.S. futures and OTC emissions. 
54
 According to ISDA’s mid-year 2010 survey, the total notional amount outstanding for OTC derivatives was around 
$466.8 trillion, of which interest rate derivatives (swaps, options, cross-currency) comprised $434.1 trillion (around 
93%). Credit derivatives, on the other hand, made up $26.3 trillion (this included credit default swaps, single name 
indexes, etc.). See ISDA, press release, 2010, http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press102510.html. 
55
 LCH.Clearnet, “2009 Annual Report and Consolidated Financial Statement,” press release, 2009, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/
2009%20Annual%20Report%20and%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Statements_tcm6-53486.pdf. 
56
 The BIS estimated the notional amount of interest rate swaps outstanding in 2009 to be $349 trillion. See 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
57
 LCH.Clearnet, “2009 Annual Report and Consolidated Financial Statement,” press release, 2009, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/
2009%20Annual%20Report%20and%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Statements_tcm6-53486.pdf. 
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84% of its shares are owned by its users and 17% are owned by exchanges.58 In 1980, long before 
LCH merged with Clearnet SA in 2003, its ownership was passed to a consortium of Britain’s six 
largest banks. Its current board of directors includes members from Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs, the London Stock Exchange, ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Citigroup, HSBC, JP Morgan, 
Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and BNP Paribas—which are some of the leading OTC derivatives 
dealers.59 LCH’s corporate governance rules require that some of its key stakeholders be 
represented on the board of directors.60 It also states that “shareholders have a particularly direct 
involvement in the business of the company and the group.”61 
On November 6, 2010, LCH.Clearnet Group Ltd., Europe’s largest clearinghouse, completed a 
buyout of shareholders, boosting its largest users’ stakes ending a nine-month struggle for control. 
LCH.Clearnet defines its biggest users as those contributing more than 1% of its total clearing 
fees. Its biggest users now own 63% of shares compared with 37% prior to the buyout.62 
Adjustments to DCO ownership and governance structures may occur as a result of Dodd-Frank 
and CFTC and SEC rules. Many banks and clearinghouses are making moves to capitalize on the 
new push toward derivatives clearing.63 To give some examples, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
joined CME’s OTC clearing division in November 2010 and Wells Fargo Securities became a 
member in February 2011. LCH.Clearnet is due to launch a “buyside” service for interest rate 
swaps.64 
Trends in Clearing and Trading 
As mentioned above, over the past 10 years, there has been a trend toward vertical integration in 
the exchange and clearinghouse industry, amongst exchanges that trade OTC derivatives. Vertical 
integration is when an exchange that executes transactions in securities or derivatives joins 
together with an existing clearinghouse or makes moves to create a clearing division of its own to 
clear and settle all of its transactions. Examples of such integration include CME Group (in 
2006),65 LCH.CLearnet (early 2000s), and ICE (mid- to late 2000s).66 
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 Ibid. 
59
 For information on LCH’s ownership structure see LCH.Clearnet, “2009 Annual Report and Consolidated Financial 
Statement,” press release, 2009, http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/
2009%20Annual%20Report%20and%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Statements_tcm6-53486.pdf. For information 
on OTC derivatives trading, see ISDA, “News Release,” press release, October 25, 2010, http://www.isda.org/media/
press/2010/press102510.html. Note that the ISDA release says: “The five largest US-based dealers reported a notional 
amount outstanding of $172.3 trillion, which is 37 percent of the total amount. This contrasts with other reports in 
which the five largest US-based dealers appear to hold 95 percent of outstandings and dominate the OTC derivatives 
market. The difference lies in the fact that the ISDA Survey takes into account the global scope and scale of the 
derivatives business, while the other figures compare the five largest U.S.-based dealers to the total held only by U.S. 
bank holding companies.”  
60
 See p. 82 of LCH.Clearnet, “LCH Annual Report,” press release, 2009, http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/
2009%20Annual%20Report%20and%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Statements_tcm6-53486.pdf. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Lisa Brennan, “Mounting Conflicts at Exchanges, Clearinghouses Prompt Concern,” Bloomberg, January 20, 2010, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayyhPhL2Vz2c. 
63
 See Jeremy Grant, “Wells Fargo becomes clearing member of CME,” Financial Times, February 1, 2011. Also see 
Louise Story, “A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading on Derivatives,” New York Times, December 10, 2010. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
  Craig Pirrong, “The Industrial Organization of Execution, Clearing and Settlement in Financial Markets,” Bauer 
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CME Group is the product of a merger between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) that occurred in 2006. The merger occurred after the Board of 
Trade Clearing Corporation (BTCC) agreed to clear Eurex transactions.67 Eurex’s entrance into 
the market directly competed with CBOT. In response, CBOT rescinded its rule that required its 
members to clear through the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation (BTCC), and required them to 
clear through CME instead. In 2006, the two were finally merged. 
ICE Clear US was originally the New York Cotton Exchange Clearing Association from 1915. It 
later became the Commodity Clearing Corporation.68 To expand its futures business it merged 
with the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), which later became ICE Futures Europe.69 It 
then partnered with the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) in 2005, to host its OTC emissions 
markets; and merged with the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) in January 2007.70 
Why have exchanges become vertically integrated with clearinghouses? Some academics argue 
that integration of trade, execution, and settlement in an exchange improves the efficiency of the 
exchange because it economizes its transaction costs.71 This happens because the merged entity 
then has the option of denying other entities access to its clearing and settlement services—
particularly those entities which trade products that are already traded on the integrated exchange. 
Vertical integration can also be beneficial because it allows the exchange to organize its 
transactions in a way that eliminates double marginalization (because it would clear and settle 
through its own facilities) and would help to avoid holdups. Vertical integration has been a 
component of financial markets long before exchanges and clearinghouses started working on 
OTC transactions. The Chicago Board of Options Exchange, for example, formed its central 
counterparty clearinghouses in 1973.72 
There is also a trend toward horizontal integration, whereby exchanges merge to compete with 
other exchange entities over derivatives, futures, and options trading. For example, in February, 
2011 news media reported that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was nearing an agreement 
to be taken over by Deutsche Borse AG.73 Such a merger would create the world’s largest 
financial exchange.74 The takeover would be the latest in a decade of mergers by exchanges 
around the world looking for new sources of growth, and competing with smaller rivals that have 
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College of Business, University of Houston, December 21, 2006, in appendix. 
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 See Intercontinental Exchange, “A History of Transparent Markets,” press release, February 10, 2011, 
https://www.theice.com/history.jhtml. 
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 Craig Pirrong, “The Industrial Organization of Execution, Clearing and Settlement in Financial Markets,” Bauer 
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 See Intercontinental Exchange, “A History of Transparent Markets,” press release, February 10, 2011, 
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 Ibid. 
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been quicker to embrace new and lucrative kinds of trading.75 Competition has also been growing 
from electronic exchanges, and those trading derivative contracts such as options and futures. For 
instance, a rising competitor for NYSE and Deutsche Borse AG is CME Group Inc.76 The Wall 
Street Journal predicted that such a new entity would supplant CME Group as the world’s largest 
futures exchange and create the biggest U.S. options group, as measured by contract volume.  
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